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LABORATORY TESTING AND THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
DAVID MANSFIELD* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Luis E. Melendez-Diaz was convicted of distributing and 
trafficking cocaine.1 The evidence against him included nineteen 
plastic bags of cocaine that he and his co-defendant dropped in a 
squad car.2 The evidence also included sworn certificates from a 
laboratory technician that affirmed the bags contained cocaine and 
stated its weight and concentration.3 Melendez-Diaz did not have the 
opportunity to cross-examine the technician responsible for writing 
these certificates and argued that they therefore should not be 
admitted into evidence.4 
The Massachusetts Appeals Court upheld the admission of the 
certificates,5 and the Massachusetts Supreme Court denied review.6 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a 
drug analysis certificate is testimonial evidence under Crawford v. 
Washington,7 and thus, whether a defendant must have the 
opportunity to cross-examine the person who issues one before such 
 
 *  2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, No. 05-P-1213, 2007 WL 2189152 at *1 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2007). 
 2. Id. at *2. 
 3. Id. at *4. 
 4. See id. at *4 & n.3 (upholding the admission of the certificates under Commonwealth v. 
Verde, 827 N.E.2d. 701 (2005), which ruled that admitting such certificates without cross-
examination does not violate the Confrontation Clause). 
 5. Id. at *4. 
 6. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 874 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 2007) (unpublished table 
decision). 
 7. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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evidence is constitutionally admissible under the Confrontation 
Clause.8 Because drug analysis certificates are prepared under oath 
and for use at trial, the Court will likely conclude that such certificates 
are testimonial evidence and that the Confrontation Clause requires 
cross-examination. 
II.  FACTS 
In the fall of 2001, the loss prevention manager of a K-Mart store 
in Dorchester, Massachusetts, reported an employee’s suspicious 
behavior to Boston Police Detective Robert Pieroway.9 The employee, 
Thomas Wright made and received several phone calls,10 after which 
he would usually leave the store and get into a blue four-door 
Mercury Sable sedan driven by Ellis Montero, who occasionally was 
accompanied by another passenger.11 The car would depart for 
roughly ten minutes before returning to drop Wright off at the store.12 
In response to this report, Pieroway set up surveillance at the store13 
and observed  Wright exit, look around for a few minutes, and then go 
back inside.14 Moments later, a blue Mercury Sable sedan drove by, 
made a U-turn, and again picked up Wright as he emerged from the 
building.15 
After Wright entered the vehicle, the driver, Ellis Montero, drove 
slowly through the store’s parking lot, at one point passing within ten 
feet of Detective Pieroway.16 When Wright ultimately exited the car 
and began walking back toward the store, Pieroway stopped him for 
questioning.17 Wright admitted to Pieroway that he was carrying 
cocaine; Pieroway then searched Wright’s person and found four bags 
containing a total of 4.75 grams of cocaine in Wright’s possession.18 
Pieroway notified Boston Police Officers Ryan and Anderson who 
stopped the Mercury Sable and arrested the driver, Montero, and the 
 
 8. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 2007 WL 2189152 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007), cert. 
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (U.S. Mar. 17, 2008) (No. 07-591). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 2007 WL 2189152 at *1. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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passenger, Melendez-Diaz.19 The officers searched neither the suspects 
nor the vehicle for contraband at this time because, according to 
police regulations, drug unit officers would conduct the search later.20 
The officers returned to the storefront to arrest Wright and 
transported all three suspects to the station in their cruiser’s 
backseat.21 
During the brief trip to the station, Montero and Melendez-Diaz 
spoke in Spanish, fidgeted, “ma[de] furtive movements,” and tried to 
create space between them.22 While the suspects were being booked, 
Anderson returned to the cruiser and found $320 by the door that 
Montero and Melendez-Diaz had used to exit the vehicle.23 Anderson 
also found nineteen plastic bags of cocaine, identical to the bags 
Pieroway recovered from Wright.24 
The State charged Melendez-Diaz with distributing and trafficking 
cocaine.25 The packets of cocaine found on Wright and those found in 
the cruiser were admitted into evidence against Melendez-Diaz,26 as 
were drug analysis certificates for the tests that technicians had 
performed on the packets.27 A jury convicted Melendez-Diaz of both 
counts.28 
On appeal, Melendez-Diaz challenged the sufficiency of the 
evidence against him, the admission of the drug certificates, and the 
effectiveness of his trial counsel.29 The Massachusetts Appeals Court 
rejected all three arguments30 and the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
denied review.31 Melendez-Diaz appealed to the Supreme Court, 
which granted certiorari.32 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at *1. 
 26. Id. at *1–2. 
 27. Id. at *4. 
 28. Id. at *1. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at *5. 
 31. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 874 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 2007) (unpublished table 
decision). 
 32. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 2007 WL 2189152 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007), cert. 
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (U.S. Mar. 17, 2008) (No. 07-591). 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Massachusetts has long admitted drug certificates without 
requiring the court to allow the defendant to cross-examine the 
responsible technician.33 Prior to 2004, such certificates were 
constitutionally admissible without confrontation so long as the 
technician was unavailable and the certificates were sufficiently 
reliable.34 Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. 
Washington in 2004, however, defendants must be given the 
opportunity to cross-examine the maker of any testimonial statement 
used against them, either at trial or at some earlier time.35 The 
question in this case is whether drug analysis certificates are 
testimonial evidence. 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: “[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”36 This guarantee applies to 
the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.37 The Supreme Court has rejected a literal reading of 
the provision, which would exclude from evidence any statement 
made by an individual not examined at trial, as unintended and 
extreme.38 Instead, the Court has permitted some limited departures 
from a strict reading in order to balance defendants’ procedural rights 
against state interests in effective law enforcement.39 
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court articulated a two-part test to 
determine when hearsay evidence may be admitted without violating 
the Confrontation Clause.40 First, the prosecution must demonstrate 
the unavailability of the witness whose statement it seeks to use.41 
Second, the hearsay in question must bear adequate indicia of 
reliability, so as to afford some basis to evaluate the credibility of the 
 
 33. Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d. 701, 704 (2005) (citing Commonwealth v. 
Slavski, 140 N.E. 465 (1923) and Commonwealth v. Harvard, 253 N.E.2d. 346 (1969)). 
 34. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980), overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 54 (2004). 
 35. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004). 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 37. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (applying the Sixth 
Amendment to the states). 
 38. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63. 
 39. Id. at 64; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (detailing the policy behind 
hearsay rules). 
 40. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. 
 41. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/30/2008  8:48:32 AM 
2008] MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS 165 
evidence in the absence of cross-examination.42 This test remained in 
effect until 2004.43 
In Crawford, the Court rejected the Roberts standard.44 Justice 
Scalia, writing for the Court, examined the history of the right to 
confrontation45 and concluded that the Framers intended the 
Confrontation Clause to bar the use of ex parte examinations as 
evidence against the accused.46 As a result, some unreliable hearsay 
(such as offhand, overheard remarks) is non-testimonial, admissible 
evidence that does not run afoul of the Confrontation Clause, while 
some reliable hearsay (particularly ex parte examinations) is 
constitutionally inadmissible because it is testimonial.47 In essence, the 
Confrontation Clause permits the defendant the right to 
confrontation when the prosecution seeks to introduce “testimonial” 
statements48 Yet, the Crawford Court did not adopt a universal 
standard for lowers courts to use to determine whether evidence is 
testimonial.49 
Under Crawford, the Confrontation Clause prohibits admission of 
testimonial statements unless the declarant is unavailable to testify 
and the defense had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant.50 Exceptions are allowed if they existed at the time of the 
Framing, but these exceptions apply primarily to statements that are 
not testimonial in nature, such as business records.51 With the 
exception of dying declarations,52 the Framers did not envision that 
prior testimony53 or other testimonial evidence could be admitted 
without the defendant having the opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant.54 Accordingly, the Court held that, even when testimonial 
hearsay is reliable, the Constitution requires the right to confrontation 
because “[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is 
 
 42. Id. at 66. 
 43. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42, 68–69 (2004) (citing the Roberts standard as 
the then-current test before overruling it). 
 44. Id. at 68–69. 
 45. Id. at 44. 
 46. Id. at 50–51. 
 47. Id. at 51. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 52 (declining to adopt any of various formulations). 
 50. Id. at 54. 
 51. Id. at 56. 
 52. Id. at 56 n.6 (recognizing that dying declarations were an exception at the time of the 
Framing and therefore are admissible without cross-examination).  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 56 n.7. 
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obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a 
defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment 
prescribes.”55 
The Court has yet to articulate a clear standard for whether 
evidence is testimonial.56 In Davis v. Washington, the Court continued 
to avoid establishing a universal standard, holding only that 
statements are not testimonial when made with the primary purpose 
of enabling police to meet an ongoing emergency.57 On the other 
hand, statements are testimonial if made to the police absent an 
emergency or made in order to prove past events for later criminal 
prosecution.58 
The first class of statements—in Davis, answers given during a 911 
call—are not testimonial because they are not offered in a formal 
context and are not meant primarily to  prove a past fact.59 Such 
statements are not analogous to trial testimony; witnesses do not take 
the stand at trial to seek assistance with an ongoing emergency.60 In 
contrast, statements from the latter class—in Davis, answers given to 
police during the stable aftermath of a domestic dispute—are 
testimonial because they are made primarily to assist police in 
investigating a possible crime.61 Such statements are therefore 
analogous to live testimony at trial, because they serve to establish 
past facts.62 
The issue in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts is whether drug 
analysis certificates are testimonial under the Crawford and Davis 
standards.63 
IV.  HOLDING BELOW 
Petitioner Melendez-Diaz appealed his conviction on three 
grounds: sufficiency of the evidence, improper admission of the drug 
certificates, and ineffective assistance of counsel.64 The Court granted 
 
 55. Id. at 61–62. 
 56. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 826–27. 
 60. Id. at 828. 
 61. Id. at 830. 
 62. Id. at 830–31. 
 63.  Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 2007 WL 2189152 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007), cert. 
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (U.S. Mar. 17, 2008) (No. 07-591). 
 64. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, No. 05-P-1213, 2007 WL 2189152 at *1 (Mass. App. 
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certiorari on only the second issue—whether admission of the drug 
certificates violated Melendez-Diaz’s Sixth Amendment right to 
confront witnesses against him.65 
The Massachusetts Appeals Court relied on Commonwealth v. 
Verde66 to flatly reject Melendez-Diaz’s argument that admitting the 
drug certificates at trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
confront witnesses against him.67 In Verde the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court held that drug certificates were non-testimonial business 
records that do not implicate the Confrontation Clause.68 
In prior cases, the Massachusetts Supreme Court had held that the 
admission of liquor or drug as evidence does not violate the 
defendant’s right to confrontation.69 The defendant in Verde argued 
that Crawford v. Washington had overturned these cases70 and 
required the court to permit the defendant to cross-examine the 
certificates’ technician even if the court deemed the evidence 
reliable.71 The Massachusetts Supreme Court disagreed because the 
Supreme Court in Crawford had indicated in dicta that business and 
official records fell under an established hearsay exception not 
subject to the Confrontation Clause.72 
The court said that public records were an acknowledged 
exception to the Confrontation Clause, dating to at least to the 
adoption of the Massachusetts Constitution.73 This exception 
established that, when a public officer in the performance of his or 
her official duty makes a record of a primary fact, that record may 
serve as prima facie evidence of that fact.74 In contrast, records 
“involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, expressions of 




 65. Id. 
 66. Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (2005). 
 67. Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 2007 WL 2189152 at *4. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Verde, 827 N.E.2d at 704 (citing Commonwealth v. Slavski, 140 N.E. 465 (1923) and 
Commonwealth v. Harvard, 253 N.E.2d 346 (1969)). 
 70. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 71. Verde, 827 N.E.2d. at 704. 
 72. Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56). 
 73. Id. at 705 (citing Slavski, 140 N.E. at 465; Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366 
(Mass. 1988)). 
 74. Id. (quoting Slavski, 140 N.E. at 465). 
 75. Id. 
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Drug analysis certificates, like those admitted against Melendez-
Diaz, are not discretionary or based on opinion because they merely 
state the results of an established scientific test as to the quantity and 
composition of a substance.76 The court noted that several other 
jurisdictions had reached the same conclusion in admitting such 
evidence,77 though it also recognized disagreement in this area.78 
Refusing to analogize drug certificates to ex parte examinations, the 
court wrote that drug certificates do not implicate “the principal evil 
at which the Confrontation Clause was directed,” specifically ex parte 
examinations by investigating magistrates.79 
The court also found it significant that a defendant can rebut the 
figures stated in the certificate, and that the defendant in Verde had 
tried and failed to do so.80 Furthermore, the issue about which Verde’s 
expert had wished to question the State’s chemist—the purity of a 
cocaine sample—was not a required element of the State’s case.81 
Regardless, “the jury w[as] free to credit [the expert’s] testimony and 
to discredit the certificate of analysis as [it] saw fit.”82 
Because the drug certificates contained records of fact only, and 
because the defendant could rebut those records, the court held that 
such certificates are non-testimonial business records.83 Therefore, the 
defendant’s inability to cross-examine the State chemist did not 
violate his confrontation right.84 
 
 76. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Harvard, 253 N.E.2d 346, 352 (Mass. 1969); 
Commonwealth v. Westerman, 611 N.E.2d 215, 223–24 (Mass. 1993)). 
 77. Id. at 705 n.4 (citing Perkins v. State, 897 So. 2d 457, 462–65 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) 
(permitting admission of an autopsy report as a business record); Smith v. State, 898 So. 2d 907, 
910–11 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (rejecting admission of a particular autopsy report because it 
contained opinion but allowing admission of autopsy reports generally as non-testimonial 
business records); People v. Johnson,  18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230, 231–33 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding 
that a laboratory report is routine documentary evidence); State v. Thackaberry, 95 P.3d 1142, 
1145 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a laboratory report of urinalysis is “analogous to—or 
arguably even the same as—a business or official record”)). 
 78. Id. (citing Las Vegas v. Walsh, 91 P.3d 591, 595 (Nev. 2004), modified by Las Vegas v. 
Walsh, 100 P.3d 658 (Nev. 2004) (rejecting admission of a statutorily required affidavit made by 
a nurse in order to show the presence of alcohol in blood because the affidavit had been 
prepared specifically for use by the prosecution at trial); People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 
393 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (holding that a blood test report prepared in anticipation of litigation 
was not admissible as a business record)). 
 79. Id. at 705 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,50 (2004)). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 706 n.5. 
 82. Id. at 706. 
 83. Id. at 705–06. 
 84. Id. at 706. 
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V.  ANALYSIS 
The Court of Appeal’s holding that drug certificates can be 
admitted without cross-examination rests on three justifications. First, 
drug certificates contain only facts, not opinion or discretion.85 Second, 
they are business records, which are non-testimonial under Crawford 
v. Washington.86 Third, the defendant can rebut these certificates and 
the jury is free to discredit them.87 All three arguments, however, are 
untenable under Crawford. 
The first justification—that the certificates reflect only facts, not 
opinions—sounds suspiciously like the “indicia of reliability” test used 
in Ohio v. Roberts.88 The Court forcefully renounced this standard in 
Crawford, declaring that the Confrontation Clause does not demand 
reliability but rather a particular means of discerning reliability: cross-
examination.89 In Davis v. Washington, the Court did not ask whether 
the statements in question were reliable, but whether the declarant’s  
primary purpose was to establish a past fact at trial.90 These 
certificates are no less able to prove a past fact at trial just because 
they contain only facts, so this factor has no bearing on whether or not 
drug analysis certificates are testimonial.91 
The second justification—that these certificates are business 
records and thus are not testimonial—is also at odds with Crawford.92 
The Court in Crawford did note that business records fall within a 
hearsay exception recognized by the Framers and that such records 
are normally non-testimonial.93 The Court also specifically noted, 
however, that testimonial evidence demands confrontation, even 
when it falls within a hearsay exception, implying that some business 
records may be testimonial.94 Thus, even if drug certificates are 
business records within the hearsay exception, they still might be 
testimonial statements and thus require an opportunity for the 
defendant to cross-examine the declarant.95 The certificates here were 
 
 85. Id. at 705. 
 86. Id. at 705. 
 87. Id. at 705–706. 
 88. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980). 
 89. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,61–62 (2004). 
 90. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826–27, 830–31 (2006). 
 91. See id. (stating the importance of whether evidence would establish a past fact at trial). 
 92. Verde, 827 N.E.2d. at 705. 
 93. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. 
 94. Id. at 56 n.7. 
 95. See id. (implying that business records may be testimonial in some cases). 
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signed under oath and include the name of the criminal defendant, 
indicating that they were solemn pronouncements made for the 
purpose of establishing facts at trial.96 Because Davis strongly suggests 
that such statements are testimonial,97 the business records exception 
does not obviate the constitutional right to cross-examination.98 
Finally, the court’s concluding justification—that these certificates 
are not testimonial because the defendant can rebut them and 
because the jury may discredit them—conflicts directly with 
Crawford.99 First, a key purpose of cross-examination is the 
defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine the declarant before the 
jury in order to give the jury grounds to believe or disbelieve the 
declarant. Therefore, the mere chance for rebuttal is not an adequate 
substitute for such a key purpose of cross-examination.100 Second, the 
Court in Crawford noted that the opportunity to rebut statements 
does not satisfy the common law doctrine of confrontation, and so the 
Appeals Court was plainly wrong to accept an opportunity for 
rebuttal as an adequate substitute for cross-examination.101 
VI.  ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION 
In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Melendez-Diaz argues 
primarily that prosecutors offer drug analysis certificates in lieu of 
testimony—in order to prove a fact at trial—and are thus testimonial 
under the standard discussed in Davis v. Washington and require that 
the defendant have an opportunity to confront the certificates’ 
technician.102 Melendez-Diaz’s arguments in response to the lower 
court’s rationale were substantially laid out above. First, though the 
certificates are documents of fact, their purported reliability is no 
longer a constitutional ground on which to admit them.103 Second, 
Melendez-Diaz argues, the certificates are not business records, and 
even if they were, the Court in Crawford stated that testimonial 
 
 96. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, App. at 24a–29a, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 2007 
WL 2189152 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (No. 07-591). 
 97. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826–27, 830–31 (2006). 
 98. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7. 
 99. Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 706 (2005). 
 100. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (2004) (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 
242–43 (1895) (overruled on other grounds)). 
 101. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (noting that the opportunity to challenge those who read 
accusatory letters in court was not enough). 
 102. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 96, at 20. 
 103. Id. at 23. 
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evidence is not insulated by hearsay exceptions.104 
The State offers an additional rationale. It argues that drug 
certificates are a contemporaneous recording of observable events, 
akin to the 9-1-1 call in Davis, rather than a narrative of past fact.105 
Melendez-Diaz responds that these certificates do not implicate the 
emergency setting present in Davis.106 He further argues that the test 
in Davis is not whether statements are contemporaneous but whether 
the prosecution offers them primarily for the purpose of establishing 
a fact at trial.107 
The State’s arguments that drug certificates are non-testimonial, 
largely ignore the Court’s concern in Davis regarding whether 
particular statements are offered to prove a fact at trial.108 Because the 
certificates are prepared specifically for use at trial—they even 
feature a defendant’s name109—they are probably testimonial under 
Davis.110 Thus, Melendez-Diaz likely has a stronger argument than the 
State based solely on Crawford and Davis. 
The State argues that regardless of whether the certificates are 
testimonial, the effect that requiring cross-examination for drug 
certificates would have on the justice system should insulate them 
from Confrontation Clause challenges.111 In Massachusetts alone, 
laboratories analyze between 38,000 and 40,000 drug samples each 
year.112 Requiring scientists to testify about each of their examinations 
“would greatly reduce the amount of time those scientists have to 
actually conduct the examinations and analyses”113 and would be of 
little use because scientists often would rely on the certificate to jog 
their memory of a specific test.”114 Thirty-five states and the District of 
Columbia agree that, if the Court ruled for Melendez-Diaz, systematic 
 
 104. Id. at 23–24. 
 105. Brief for the Respondent at 27, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, No. 07-591 (U.S. Feb. 
5, 2008). 
 106. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 96, at 25. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See supra notes 85–101 and accompanying text. 
 109. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 96, at App. 24a–29a. 
 110. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 826–27, 830–31 (2006). 
 111. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 105, at 34. 
 112. Id. at 35 (citing Brief for the Attorney General and Department of Public Health as 
Amici Curiae Supporting the Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Verde, No. SJC-09320, 2004 
WL 3421947, at *5 (2004)). 
 113. Id. (citing Pruitt v. State, 954 So. 2d 611, 615 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006)). 
 114. Id. (citing People v. Johnson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230, 233 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)). 
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gridlock would result.115 
Melendez-Diaz responds, however, that several states require 
forensic examiners to testify if the defendant so requests, and that in 
these states the criminal justice system has not collapsed.116 To explain 
this phenomenon, Melendez-Diaz points to language authored by the 
State: 
[I]t is almost always the case that [forensic laboratory reports] are 
admitted without objection. Generally, defendants do not object to 
the admission of drug certificates most likely because there is no 
benefit to the defendant from such testimony. The testimony of the 
analyst will only serve to resolve any possibility of reasonable 
doubt, not only in the identification of the substance as contraband 
but also as to the weight of the substance for trafficking offenses.117 
Several law professors who support Melendez-Diaz assert that the 
burdens will be slight because stipulations,118 notice-and-demand 
statutes,119 clever courtroom scheduling,120 video testimony,121 and (in 
some narrow circumstances) surrogate testimony will all reduce the 
impact of requiring cross-examination for forensic reports,122 but that, 
in those rare cases when forensic evidence is manipulated or 
defective, cross-examination is critical to check the prosecution.123 
The State’s concerns are considerable, especially because of the 
Supreme Court’s practice of balancing the accused’s interests with law 
 
 115. Brief for the State of Alabama, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, No. 07-591 (U.S. Sep. 9, 2008)). 
 116. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 10–11, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, No. 07-591 
(U.S. Feb. 19, 2008). 
 117. Id. at 11 (citing Brief for the Commonwealth as Amicus Curiae at 7, Commonwealth v. 
Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (Mass. 2005), available at 2004 WL 3421945). 
 118. Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, Melendez-Diaz 
v. Massachusetts, No. 07-591 (U.S. Jun. 23, 2008). 
 119. Id. at 13 (describing a mechanism by which prosecutors would service defendants’ 
notice of intent to offer forensic testimony without cross-examination and in which defendants 
would have the right to demand cross-examination). 
 120. Id. at 16 (describing the use of courtroom scheduling to mitigate the need for repeated 
travel for individual analysts). 
 121. Id. at 17 (describing how such testimony would allow the jury to view body language 
and demeanor while reducing the expense of bringing the analyst to court). 
 122. Id. at 23 (arguing that, when “(1) conducting another test is infeasible; (2) the original 
test was conducted in accordance with regularized procedures and documented in sufficient 
detail for another expert to understand, interpret, and evaluate the results, and (3) the original 
expert is now unavailable,” the Confrontation Clause permits testimony by another qualified 
expert about the analysis). 
 123. Id. (citing Brief for Professor Pamela R. Metzger et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 12–20 & App., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, No. 07-591 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2007)). 
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enforcement’s interests in the Confrontation Clause area.124 
Melendez-Diaz and the law professor amici convincingly argue, 
however, that the State exaggerates the dangers of permitting cross-
examination here.125 The State’s policy arguments are unlikely to 
prevail given the strength of petitioner’s argument that drug analysis 
certificates are testimonial evidence under Crawford and Davis, which 
provide Melendez-Diaz with a constitutional right to cross-examine 
the issuer.126 
The real questions in this case do not involve who will prevail—
Melendez-Diaz will, in all likelihood, if the above analysis is correct—
but instead involve (1) whether the Court will articulate a more 
complete standard for what statements are testimonial and (2) 
whether the Court will again rule unanimously or 8-1, as it has done in 
Crawford and Davis. These two questions are in tension and a more 
detailed articulation may spark dissent. I offer tentative hypotheses 
on each question. 
First, because Davis, without any significant elaboration, supports 
Melendez-Diaz’s case, the Court can follow the language of that 
decision with little additional reasoning.127 The Court has been 
reluctant to articulate a full standard thus far, and it is likely that they 
will not do so here.128 
Second, the Court will likely remain unanimous, or nearly so, 
particularly if the Justices refuse to adopt a more exact test. Among 
the sitting Justices, only Justice Thomas has expressed reservations 
about the Crawford line of cases. Justice Thomas dissented in part in 
Davis, arguing that whether evidence is testimonial should be 
determined by its formality.129 He also wrote that the Confrontation 
Clause should apply when the prosecution seeks to avoid cross-
examination.130 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts implicates both issues, 
because the certificates are sworn statements,131 which for policy 
reasons the State introduced to avoid cross-examination.132 As such, 
 
 124. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980). 
 125. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 116, at 10–11; Brief for Law Professors as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 118, at 10, 13, 16–17, 23. 
 126. See supra notes 108–110 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra notes 85–101 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 129. Crawford v. Washington, 547 U.S. at 834, 840 (2004). 
 130. Id. at 840. 
 131. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 96, App. at 24a–29a. 
 132. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 105, at 34. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/30/2008  8:48:32 AM 
174 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:161 
Justice Thomas will likely also side with the Melendez-Diaz here, 
though it would be unsurprising if he dissented again. 
The likely result then, is a narrow, unanimous (or 8-1) ruling for 
the petitioner that drug analysis certificates are testimonial evidence 
that are subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. 
 
 
